Ukr.Biochem.J. 2013; Volume 85, Issue 6, Nov-Dec, pp. 84-93

doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/ubj85.06.084

The creation of a contagious H5N1 influenza virus: implications for the education of life scientists

11.11.2015   Uncategorized   No comments

T. Novossiolova, M. Minehata, M. Dando

Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Division of Peace Studies School of Social and
International Studies University of Bradford UK

The paper contends that the ongoing controversy surrounding the creation of a contagious H5N1 influenza virus has already exposed the severe limitations of the possibility of preventing the hostile misuse of the life scien­ces by dint of oversight of proposals and publications. It further argues that in order to prevent the potential wholesale militarisation of the life sciences, it is essential that life scientists become aware of their responsibilities within the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and actively contribute their expertise to strengthening the biological weapons non-proliferation regime.

Keywords: , , , , ,

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